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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN G. HENDRIE COMPANY, INC., 
a corporation, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, LAURETTA 
M. GLADDEN, widow, and LOUISE 
GLADDEN, for and on behalf of DAR-
LENE LOUISE GLADDEN, minor 
child of CLARENCE ROLAND GLAD-
DEN, deceased. 
PlaintiJff, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The petition of John G. Hendrie Company, Inc., the 
plaintiff above named, respectfully shows to the Honor-
able Supreme Court : 
1. The above entitled court filed its decision in 
favor of defendants and against plaintiff on June 19, 
1961. 
2. By order of the Court duly entered herein, on 
good cause sho·wn and pursuant to Rule 76 (e) (4), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the time in which plaintiff 
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might petition for a rehearing has been extended to and 
including the date of the filing hereof. 
3. By its decision, aforesaid, the court erred on 
the following points, to-wit: 
A. In finding and deciding the plaintiff's Super-
intendent of construction, Smith, was the "alter ego" of 
plaintiff and that said Smith appeared to have had 
plenary power to act for it; because the same are against 
the law and are unsupported by any competent evidence. 
B. In ruling that plaintiff's superintendent of con-
struction, Smith, was acting within the scope of his 
authority in making the alleged statements upon which 
the defendant Industrial Commission based its award; 
because the same is contrary to the law and the evidence. 
C. In finding and deciding that the statements made 
by Smith to defendant Lauretta Gladden and others, were 
not hearsay as to plaintiff, for the reason that such 
finding and decision is against the law. 
D. In failing to vacate the award made by the 
Industrial Commission to the defendant Gladden, for the 
reason that such award is not supported by any compe-
tent evidence. 
WHEREFORE petitioning plaintiff prays that the 
court reconsider its said decision and recall the same and 
enter its judgment and decision vacating the award to 
the defendants Gladden, or, in the alternative, direct a 
new argument and new hearing upon the issues and upon 
such hearing to vacate said award as aforesaid, and that 
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the court enter such other and further order and judg-
Inent as may be just and proper. 
PAUL THATCHER of 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN, 
and 
FUGATE, MITCHEM, McGINLEY, 
and HOFFMAN, 
Attorneys for Plamtiff 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The essence and basis of the decision of the court 
affirming the award of Workmen's Compensation bene-
fits to the individual defendants herein is found in the 
following excerpts from the court's opinion: 
"As to 3): The plaintiff is a foreign corpora-
tion and was constructing the swimming pool in 
Utah by .its alter ego, Smith, the construction 
superintendent. The record indicates that he was 
the top employee of the company here and he 
appears to have had plenary power to act for ~t. 
We cannot say that he was acting without the 
scope of authovrity in attending to an inquiry, 
whether at the request of the Gladdens or anyone 
else, where responsibility of his company may or 
may not be involved. Moreover, plaintiff's claim 
that any statement he may have made were hear-
say and therefore inadmissible in evidence, imply-
ing that, being thus, the Commission could not 
base an award solely on hearsay, is not with 
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merit. Smith was present at the conversation with 
the widow and the others, and being an authorized 
agent of the plaintiff, such statements as he may 
have made certainly wou~d not be hearsay, .... " 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The writer of this brief feels that he must have some-
how failed, perhaps through overconfidence, to be of 
adequate assistance to the court in its consideration of 
the matters discussed in the quoted excerpts from the 
court's decision, for the underscored and critical por-
tions of the court's opinion are not based upon any facts 
or law, but are contrary to the facts and the law, and, 
it is very respectfully submitted, reflect a complete mis-
apprehension of the nature and significance of the legal 
issues involved. 
Accordingly, the record has again been very care-
fully searched for all of the evidence bearing on the key 
issue, which is the nature and extent of the authority of 
plaintiff's superintendent of construction, Smith. All of 
the evidence bearing on Smith's relationship to the plain-
tiff corporation is set out in the following: 
At the cornn1encement of the hearing Smith, who was 
present as a witness, volunteered the statement (not 
under oath) ''I'm the superintendent of construction, and 
was on the job at the time of the accident." R 16, lines 
23 and 24. When sworn as a witness, he testified that 
he was ''employed" hy plaintiff. R 19, lines 20 to 24. 
He also testified that he was employed in the "capacity" 
of "superintendent of constructi-on." R 20, lines 2 to 5. 
He had the deceased Gladden under his supervision. R 
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20, lines 6 to 8. At the time of and immediately preceding 
the accident (on the same day) there was no other person 
on the job in charge and authorized to give orders to 
decedent. R 32, lines 17 to 19. (It is to be noted that 
this testimony was a "follow up" to his answer that he 
had never changed the order directing Gladden to stay 
out of the ditch.) At the place and time of the accident, 
there were only three men on plaintiff's payroll, Smith, 
the witness Kahre, and Gladden. R 36, lines 3 to 7. 
According to the witness Terkelson, Smith, after 
ordering Gladden to stay out of the ditch, left the im-
mediate scene of the accident and only came running 
back thereafter. R 60, lines 17 to 19. 
The witness Kahre, who was on the scene to do some 
work and also to learn the swimming pool business with 
a view to joining the owners therein, testified that John 
Hendrie was the president of the company, and had 
wanted the witness Kahre to go to Clearfield, and sent 
Smith along to show Kahre the principles of pool con-
struction. He testified that Smith was ''you might say, a 
superintendent." R 69. 
After the accident certain relatives of the decedent 
Gladden came to Kahre on the job and asked him if he 
was ''the foreman," and he told them, "No, that Bill 
Smith was out in the tool shed." 
The foregoing is all of the evidence whatsoever rela-
ting to the position or authority of Smith with the plain-
tiff or as to the identity of the officers or agents. It is 
to be noted that Mr. Hendrie, the president of the com-
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pany which bears his name, was in general charge and 
in control of Smith, and that Smith, when asked as to 
those having the direction of the defendant, stated that 
he was the only one there "at the time" who had authority 
to give Gladden orders. 
There is not one scint~lla of ev~dence that Smith had 
any authority to negot~ate clat'ms or to make statements 
or representations of fact. He was characterized either 
as "foreman" or ''superintendent of construction," and 
there is no evidence that he ever performed any duties 
outside of the direction of construction during the hours 
he was on the job. It will be recalled that the job had 
closed down after the accident, that Smith had gone home, 
showered and had dinner and did not even go to the place 
where the alleged statements were made until some six 
hours or more after the accident. There is nothing to 
show that he attended the meeting at the home of the 
Gladden's relatives as superintendent of construction or 
that he was authorized to attend in behalf of the com-
pany. He did not go there pursuant to any order, but at 
the request of the relatives of Mrs. Gladden. There is 
nothing to show that he was on the payroll and drawing 
any pay for the time he spent with the1n. .As we say, 
there is not a scintilla of evidence that the statements 
were made as superintendent of construction or foreman, 
or that the superintendent of construction or foreman had 
any authority to make the alleged declarations or ad-
missions for or in behalf of the plaintiff company. 
We most earnestly invite the court and each indivi-
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dual justice thereof to satisfy themselves and himself 
of the truth of these statements of fact by a personal 
inspection and search of the record. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
UNDER THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW, 
Sl\IITH liAD NO AUT'HORITY TO REPRESENT OR 
BIND PLAINTIFF CORPORATION IN MAKING 
THE ALLEGED ADMISSIONS AND DECLARA-
TIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST, AND 
THE SAl\fE ARE HEARSAY AND INCOMPETENT 
AS TO PLAINTIFF. 
POINT II 
THEREFORE THE AWARD IS UNSUPPORTED 
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE, AND MUST BE 
VACATED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW, 
Sl\:fiTH HAD NO AUTHORITY TO REPRESENT OR 
BIND PLAINTIFF CORPORATION IN MAKING 
THE ALLEGED ADMISSIONS AND DECLARA-
TIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST, AND 
THE SAl\fE ARE HEARSAY AND INCOMPETENT 
AS TO PLAINTIFF. 
It is most distressing to the writer to find that in 
his original brief he so far failed to communicate clearly 
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and accurately to the court the true theory and basis of 
plaintiff's case that the same was very obviously com-
pletely misapprehended by the court. It is hoped that 
the court will hear with him while he attempts to correct, 
as best he can, this failure, for, it is submitted, the record 
and the established law of Utah overwhelmingly require 
a ruling that the superintendent of construction, Smith, 
was without authority, and was outside the scope of his 
employment as a superintendent of construction in dis-
cussing legal liability and questions of fault as to a past 
transaction. 
On the other hand, it is respectfully submitted that 
the statement of the court that Smith, was the "alter 
ego" of the plaintiff corporation is completely and ab-
solutely gratuitous and without any foundation in fact 
or law. It is believed that this statement in the opinion 
of the court surely must have been a mere inadvertence, 
and an adherence thereto would be a manifest mis-
carriage of justice. 
John Hendrie is the President and head of the cor-
poration which bore his name. It is admitted that S1nith 
was in charge and direction of the construction of the 
swi1nming pool and could and did give orders to plain-
tiff's employees while they were on that job performing 
construction work. One of the employees regarded him 
as the ''foreman." The title of "superintendent of con-
struction," is obviously a mere exan1ple· of salesmanship 
in employer-e1nployee relations: a man with a fine 
sounding title is presu1ned to be happier and more dili-
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gent and responsible. Smith was not ''superintendent of 
claims"; neither was he an officer of the corporation; 
neither was he a claims adjuster; neither was he an 
attorney for the corporation; neither was he its auditor 
authorized to negotiate or settle claims or to discuss lia-
bilities with claimants. He was only a superintendent 
of construction. There is not one iota of evidence that he 
had any authority to give anyone any orders after the 
end of the working day, or to represent his employer off 
the job site, or even on the job site with respect to any-
thing except those matters bearing directly on construc-
tion, and even this must be implied from his title as 
"construction superintendent." 
It is clear that under the law or agency a principal 
may employ a general agent and give him some general 
powers and authority about a particular phase of the 
principal's business without giving him "plenary" power, 
or making the agent the "alter ego" of the corporation. 
One may give sorne power without giving ,all. To hold 
that a corporation cannot employ a superintendent of 
construction and entrust to him the supervision of con-
struction work without also losing control of authority to 
negotiate claims and confess legal liability or legal fault 
would be a most mischievous rule and would open wide 
the gates for all kinds of fraud; yet that is the effect of 
the decision herein. It is not the rule of law in Utah, or 
even elsewhere, except where modified by statute. 
Defendants and respondants in their brief (to which 
plaintiff had no opportunity to reply effectively) begin-
ning on page 10, quote copiously' 'Wigmore on Evidence." 
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Without indicating the deletion, they did, however, delete 
that portion of Wigmore's discussion which deals with 
the facts and the situation here before the court. It is 
to be noted that Wigmore, the expert on evidence, in the 
second quoted paragraph referred to, declares that the 
question turns on the scope of authority and depends 
upon the doctrine of agency applied to the circumstances 
of the case, and not upon any rule of evidence. We should 
like at this point to supply a portion of the deleted 
material (pausing to note that we have not included that 
portion of Dean Wigmore's quotation dealing with res 
gestae declarations made by an agent while he is .actually 
engaged in the performance of his primary functions and 
duties as an agent, as that is not, of course, the case 
before the court). See 
Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Section 
1078: 
"The common phrasing of the principle s well 
represented in the following passages. 
'1839, Buchanan, C. J., in Franklin Bank vs. 
Pennsylvania D. & JI!I. S. N. Co., 11 G & J. 28, 33: 
. . . . But declarations or adJnissions by an agent, 
of his own authority, and not accompanying the 
making of a contract, or the doing of an act, in 
behalf of his principal, nor made at the time he is 
engaged in the transaction to which they refer, 
are not binding upon his principal, not being part 
of the "res gestae," and are not admissable in 
evidence, but come within the general rule of law, 
excluding hearsay evidence; being but an account 
or statement by an agent of what has passed or 
been done or omitted to be done,-not a part of 
10 
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the transaction, but only statements or admissions 
respecting it. ' " 
A little later in the same section Dean Wigmore 
comments that: 
"Upon the application of the prinple to specific 
instances, it would be useless to enter, for only 
the rules of the substantive law of agency are in-
volved." 
He then cites many illustrative cases, including some of 
the Utah cases hereinafter referred to. 
See also 31 C. J. S. Evidence, 
Section 343, Page 1113, 
where the general rule~ and distinctions applicable are 
stated as follows : 
"As it has been said to have been well stated in 
Corpus Juris, an admission of an agent or em-
ployee may be received in evidence against his 
principle, if relevent to the issues invloved, 
where the agent, in making the admission, was 
act·ing within the scope of his authority, and 
the transaction or negotiation to which the ad-
mission relates was pending at the time when it 
was made. (Emphasis Supplied). 
"Conversely, a declaration of an agent not within 
the scope of his authority nor in·the course of the 
negotiation to which it refers, is not admissible 
against the principal. ... " (Citing a multitude of 
cases, including several from Utah hereinafter 
ref erred to) . 
It is the second quoted paragraph which is obviously 
applicable here, because Smith, in talking to decedent's 
11 
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family the night after the accident, was not dealing with 
construction nor was he in the course of negotiation for 
construction nor engaged in anything which would pro-
mote construction in any way, but merely expressing an 
opinion (if defendants' witnesses are to be believed) with 
respect to what he should or should not have done, from 
which opinion the individual defendants here seek to infer 
a statement that he did send Gladden to the trench. If 
he had made this direct statement, namely, that he had 
sent Gladden back into the trench, this would have been, 
of course, a narrative statement about a past event, and 
under the rule is totally inadmissible; an inferred post 
hoc narrative statement should be even more clearly in-
admissible. See : 
31 C. J. S., Evidence, 
Section 364, Note 94. 
The rule is the same whether the principal is a cor-
poration or a natural person. 
See 19 C. J. S., Corporations, 
Sections 1068 and 1070, pages 607 and 608. 
In S'ection 1070, it is declared, in accordance with 
the general rule, that "authority to make admissions as 
to past events is not inferred from the powers of a 
general agent to superintend the company's business." 
See also 2 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of 
Private Corporations (1954 revised volume) 
Sections 733, 735, 740 and 745. 
There the learned author, citing some smnples from a 
multitude of court decisions, declared that admissions by 
officers and agents of corporations are not admissible 
12 
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against the corporations unless the admission itself (as 
distinguished from the act to which it refers) is within 
the scope of the agent's employment and authority, is a 
part of the res gestae, or is adn1issible under som·e other 
exception to the hearsay rule, such as the "shopbook" 
rule, or where it is contained in a record or report inci-
dent to and constituting a part of his ordinary and regular 
employment, or is a part of a communication which he is 
specifically employed, authorized and directed to make. 
He notes that the rule is particularly applicable as to 
the admissions of officers and agents relating to past 
events, which are normally excluded as being outside the 
scope of a corporate agent's or officer's employment. 
Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corpora-
tions, Vol. 2, (1954 Rev. Vol.), Section 745, Page 1046, 
comments that 
"The cases holding the extreme doctrine that a 
managing officer or agent of a corporation is its 
alter ego, and that his declarations, whether made 
casually or in line with his duties, or whether 
connected in time or place with the matter to which 
they relate or entirely dissociated therefrom, are 
competent evidence against the corporation, are 
·against the overwhelming weight of authority." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
In view of the fact that the decision here character-
izes a "superintendent of construction" as the corpora-
tion's ''alter ego," it is most interesting to observe the 
opinion of Fletcher that this is an extreme rule, even 
when applied to a "managing officer or agent." 
In view of Dean Wigmore's comment, above quoted, 
13 
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that the controlling principle is one of the substantive 
law of Agency, rather than the law of Evidence, we would 
do well to turn to an honored standard work on the law 
of Agency. In the 
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law: 
Agency 2d, Sections 286 and 288 
we find that the learned members of the Institute and 
their reporters have adopted the rules for which we here 
contend. 
Section 286 reads as follows: 
"In an action between a principal and a third 
person, statements of an agent to a third person 
are admissible in evidence against the principal 
to prove the truth of facts asserted in them as 
though they were made by the principal, if the 
agent was a~tthorized to make the statement or 
was authorize,d to make, on the principal's behalf, 
any statements concerning the subject matter." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
In this case, there is absolutely no evidence that 
Smith was authorized to "blab or tattle" concerning, or 
to make any statement whatsoever about his principal's 
business to any person whomsoever. It is submitted that 
the court should take judicial notice that employers 
generally abhor indiscri1ninate talk or tattle about the 
employer's business by subordinat'e or petty foremen 
or superintendents, or any by employees or officers, for 
that matter. Accordingly, it is the universal and salutary 
rule that proof of authority to make a stateinent is neces-
sary before a statement by an agent is admissible against 
his principal, and that authority to do an act does not 
14 
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intply or include authority thereafter to "tattle" or n1ake 
staten1ents about the act. This is the rule adopted by the 
Restatement in Section 288, above referred to: 
''When agent has authority to make statements: 
" ( 1) The general rules concerning the inter-
pretation of authority are applicable in det'er-
mining whether an agent has authority to make 
staternents concerning operative or other facts. 
"(2) Authority to do an act or to conduct a 
transaction does not, of itself, include authority 
to make statements concerning the act or trans-
action. 
"(3) Authority to 1nake statements of fact does 
not of itself include authority to make state-
ments admitting liability because of such facts." 
Obviously, paragraph two of Section 288 is control-
ling here, and Smith's authority to supervise construction 
of the swimming pool at Clearfield did not include au-
thority to make statements concerning his supervision 
thereof. 
See also the discussion under Sections 286 and 288 
of the Restatement of the Law; Agency 2d7 where the 
rule is explained and applied. See also the Appendix 
thereto and the cases therein cited. 
It is interesting, and we believe, persuasive to note 
in passing that even though the Utah Supreme Court's 
Com1nittee on Rules of Evidence, appointed to consider 
and report upon the advisability of adopting rules of 
evidence, made a report and recommendation to the court 
which greatly liberalized the rules of evidence, even the 
recommended liberalized rules would not permit the ad-
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mission in evidence of Smith's declarations here relied 
upon. See the Proposed Final Draft of the Rules of Evi-
dence, submitted to this court under date of March 2, 
1959, Rule 63 (9) (a). The proposed rule reads: 
"Evidence of a statement which is made other 
than by a witness while testifying at the hearing 
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is 
hearsay evidence and inadmissible except: . . . 
(9) Vicarious Admiss,vons. As a~ainst a party, 
a statement which would be admissible if made by 
the declarant at the hearing if (a) the judge finds 
the .declarent is unavailable as a w~tness and that 
the statement concerned a matter within the scope 
of an agency or employment of the declarant for 
the party and was made before the terminration of 
such relationship." (Emphasis supplied) 
The declarant, Smith, of course, was available, and 
testified at the hearing, so that even under the proposed 
liberalized rule, the declaration would be hearsay and 
incompetent. 
So much for general statements of the law as set 
out by legal scholars and encyclopedists. Let us turn now 
to a consideration of the law as it has been established in 
Utah by judicial precedent binding on this court. 
Until the filing of the decision under consideration 
here, there has never been any doubt as to what the law 
was in Utah. From its first consideration of the problem 
in 
Idaho Forwarding Company vs. Fireman's Fund 
Insurance Company ( 1892) 
8 Utah 41, 29 Pac. 826, 
16 
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to and including the last case, 
S. vV. Bridges & Company vs. Candland (1936) 
88 Utah 373, 54 Pac. 2d 842, 
(referred to in the original brief herein, but not in the 
opinion of the court), the decisions of this court have 
been many and uniform, and all have held that evidence 
of an agent's or ernployee's declarations subsequent to 
the event and unconnected with the performance of the 
agent's duties are outside of his authority, are not bind-
ing on his principal, are hearsay and are incompetent as 
to the principal. There has been no variation and no 
dissent. 
In hope that it will be of assistance to the court, we 
shall now bdefly refer to and discuss the Utah cases we 
have been able to find dealing with the question con-
fronting us. 
In 
Idaho Forwarding Company vs. Fireman's Fund 
Insurance Company, supra, 
an issue was drawn as to whether or not a contract of 
insurance was consummated. The court says: 
Witnesses were permitted over the objection of 
the defendant's counsel, to testify to admissions 
of the agent Mallory, made long after the alleged 
contract was made, to the effect that the property 
was insured. To the ruling of the court in over-
ruling such objections, the counsel for the defend-
ant excepted and assigned the same as error. A 
witness may testify to the language of an agent 
in making an oral contract, because such language 
is within the agent's authority. But being au-
thorized to make the contract, his language in 
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making it is authorized by the principal. But 
authority to make a contract does not empower the 
agent at a subsequent time to admit away his 
principal's rights. 'The admissions of an agent 
are admissible so far as the principal has author-
iz'ed them to be made, and no further .... The 
court said in the case of Railroad Company vs. 
O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99, .... "Referring to the rule 
as stated by Mr. Justice Story in his Treatise on 
Agency, (Section 134) that, 'where the acts of 
the agent will bind the principal, there his re-
presentations, declarations, and admissions res-
pecting the subject matter will also bind him, if 
made at the same time, and constituting a part 
of the res gestae.' The Court, speaking by Mr. 
Justice Strong said: 'A close attention to this 
rule, which is of universal acceptance, will solve 
almost every difficulty. But an act done by an 
agent cannot be varied, qualifred, or explained 
either by his declarations, which amount to no 
more than a mere narrative of a past occurrence, 
or by an isolated conversation held, or an isolated 
act done, at a later period. The reason is that the 
agent to do the act is not authorized to narrate 
what he had done, or how he had done it, and his 
declaration is no part of the res gestae.' For the 
reasons, above indicat·ed, the court is of the 
opinion that the judgment of the court below 
should be reversed and that a new trial should 
be granted. 
And this Court, in the case of 
Moyle vs. Congregational Society of 8alt Lake 
City (1897) 
16 Utah, 69, 83; 50 Pac. 630, 
considered the principles, the authorities and the jurists 
very carefully, and ruled that the ad1nissions and declara-
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tions of an agent, 1nade several days after he had con-
HUmlnated a contract for his principal, and involving an 
admission of breach of contract alleged to have occurred 
previously, were hearsay, incmupetent and inadmissible 
as to the agent's principal. Their admission in evidence 
was held error. 
And in the case of 
Meyers vs. San Pedro, 
L.A. & S.L. Railroad Co. (1909) 
36 Utah 307, 104 Pac. 736; 
Second appeal: 
37 Utah 198, 116 Pac. 1119, 
this court held that, in the absence of affirmative proof 
of the authority of a "superintendent" of a railroad divi-
sion to make admissions and statements concerning the 
eause of his acts, admissions in a letter of discharge given 
a conductor after an accident were not admissible against 
the railroad. In the second appeal, after a second trial 
the court held that proof that it was an established duty 
of the superintendent to make a record of such accidents 
and to declare the facts relative to the cause of discharge 
of the conductor, and proof that the recording and report-
ing of such facts were within the scope of his duties and 
authority supplied the deficiency in evidence which ex-
isted in the first appeal. The letter in question was there-
fore admissible at the second trial, because of such addi-
tional proof. The court, however, adhered to the principle 
announced in the first appeal; namely, that the position 
of superintendent did not imply any authority to make 
admissions, and that authority to make admissions would 
not be inferred or implied from the title of superintendent 
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or from the admitted duty to direct operations of the 
railroad, the making of admissions being quite separate 
from the direction of operation. It is believed that a care-
ful reading of these two appeals will be most helpful to 
the court in clarifying the existing confusion. 
Of course, in the case now at Bar, there is absolutely 
no evidence that this plaintiff's superintendent was re-
quired to make any statements to the family of the de-
cedent or that the statements were made in the course 
of, or pursuant to any duty whatsoever existing in con-
nection with his employment as superintendent of con-
struction. 
of 
The same problem was before this court in the case 
Utah Foundry and 1\fachine Company v. Utah Gas 
& Coke Company (1912, cert. den. April 30, 1913) 
42 Utah 533, 131 Pac. 1173. 
The matter there under consideration was defendant's 
counterclam for conversion of certain iron, and the 
counterclaiming defendant offered in evidence certain 
statements made by an officer of the plaintiff, to-wit: 
the secretary, who is also its bookkeeper and collector, 
with respect to the purpose of issuing certain checks by 
plaintiff. The statements tended to support defendant's 
counterclaim. This court held that these admissions by 
the secretary, bookkeeper and collector of the corporation 
with respect to the purpose of the checks issued were 
incompetent, hearsay, and inadmissible, and could not 
support a judgment on the counterclaim. The judgment 
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was ordered vacated. In the course of its opinion, the 
court said, 
"The ntle is well settled that, to bind the 
principal with an admissions of his agent, the 
declaration or statement of the agent must have 
been made within the scope of his employment and 
dttr,ing the transaction of business by him for the 
principal and in relation to such business; that is, 
the .declaration, or statement, of the agent must be 
contemporaneo1ts with or in the course of the 
bttsiness or transaction and in relati,on thereto 
conducted by the agent for the principal within 
the .scope of the agency. The declarations or state-
ments of the agent here were not made lmder any 
such circumstance. They were made long after the 
transactions with respect to which they were de-
clared had wholly ended, long after the business 
had been conducted, and were not made in the 
course of or in relation to any business which the 
agent was then transacting or conducting for the 
principal. Certainly, an agent not in the course 
or transaction of any business for his principal, 
may not on the public mart or elsewhere make 
binding admissions of fact against his principal 
by a mere narration of facts relating to transac-
tions wholly ended and long past. Property 
rights of the principal cannot be bartered away 
in any such manner as that. 
Croft (the secretary of plaintiff) of course, 
could have been called as a witness and permitted 
to testify to any fact within his lmowledge. But 
his admission under the circumstances was not 
evidence against his principal, the plaintiff. He 
was called as a witness, not by the defendant, but 
by the plaintiff, and gave testimony, not only in 
dispute with the admission, but of facts wholly 
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at war with it. We think the evidence insuffici'ent 
to sustain the defendant's counterclaim. The judg-
ment, therefore, cannot be sustained .... " (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
The same question was once more presented to thi's 
court in the case of 
'Tyng vs. Constant-Loraine Investment Company 
(1916) 47 Utah 330, 154 Pac. 766. 
This court there once more affirmed the n1le "'~v"hje1 1 
plaintiff here contends for, and held that even the presi-
dent of a corporation had no authority by virtue of his 
office, to make admissions against his corporation as to 
past events. Certainly, if the president of a corporation 
cannot make such admissions by virtue of his office, a 
mere employee, or foreman, even though called a "sup-
erintendent of construction," cannot make such admis-
sions. The court held that the admissions of the presi-:-
dent were hearsay and incompetent as to the corporation 
itself, as not being within the scope of the employment 
and authority of the president. 
Once more, this question of law was before this court 
in the case of 
White vs. Utah Condensed Milk Company 50 Utah 
278, 167 Pac. 656, 660. 
This court again affirmed the rule for which plaintiff 
contends, and extended its operation to a corporation's 
general manager. The evidence which the trial court re-
ceived, improperly as this court held, was to the effect 
that plaintiff, after suffering an injury to his eyes, ap-
plied to defendant's general manager for re-employment 
and was told that, ''they did not feel safe ·with me in the 
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boiler room with my vision in that condition." This was 
introduced to prove an admission of incapacitating dam-
age to plaintiff's vision. The court said the general man-
ager was neither qualified nor authorized to make ad-
missions respecting the seriousness of plaintiff's injury 
at the time and under the circumstances shown in the 
record. 1--Iis declarations outside of the scope of his em-
ployment were not admissible against his principal, the 
defendant. The judgment for plaintiff was reversed upon 
the authority of the Meyers vs. San Pedro, etc., Railroad 
Company case, supra. 
Certainly, if a general manager has no authority 
implied from the fact of his position, a mere superin-
tendent of construction, a mere employee foreman, has 
no such authority implied by reason of his position. 
Finally, in 1936, in the case of 
S. W. Bridges and Company vs. Candland, 88 
Utah 373, 54 Pac. 2d 842, 
this court positively and finally held 
( 1) that the opinion of an agent involving con-
sciousness of liability or fault is admissible against the 
principal as an admission only where made within the 
scope of the agent's authority, and 
(2) that although the principal 1s bound by acts 
or statements of the agent done or made within his au-
thority or apparent authority, the act or statement of the 
agent showing on its face that it is adverse to the princi-
pal, presents notice to the third person that there is no 
authority therefor, and 
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( 3) that in the action on a brokerage contract for 
the sale of wool, statements of the agent of the plaintiff 
that plaintiff had failed to carry out the contract and 
caused loss to defendant are not admis,sible as a;dmiJssions 
of the plaintiff since not within the authority of the 
agent. The court quotes at length from Wigmore on 
Evvdence, Section 1078, above mentioned, and from the 
case of Franklt1~ Bank v. Pennsylvania, etc., Co., quoted 
by Wigmore and above quoted in part, and follows the 
Frankin Bank case, with approval. From then until now, 
so far as we have been able to ascertain, this firmly es-
tablished rule has never been challenged in Utah, ap-
parently being regarded as settled for all time in ac-
corcdance with sound policy and universal precedent. 
It should not now he set aside or ignored by this court 
or any other tribunal in Utah. 
We have saved until the last, the final case which 
our research has disclosed, decided by this court in 1929, 
because it seems to us to be exactly in point and control-
ling. It is the case of 
Fishlake Resort ·Company v. Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah, 73 Utah 479, 275 Pac. 580. 
We have checked this case in Shepard's Pacific Reporter 
Citator Service and find that the rule established by 
that case has never been overruled, limited or challenged, 
and still states the law of the State of Utah with respect 
to the facts involved. 
In the Fishlake Resort Company case, supra, the 
Industrial Commission made an award of compensation 
to a widow for the death of her husband, who was alleged 
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to have drowned in the course of employment fishing in 
Bear Lake for the plaintiff company, the operator of a 
hotel and dining room. The decedent was and for three 
months had been, admittedly employed by the plaintiff 
company as a handy man. He made repairs to boats, did 
carpenter work, attended to the hoathouse and did other 
odd jobs. One Dan Baker was the boathouseman, ap-
parently in charge of the boathouse and boats. On the 
day of his death, the decedent had worked the morning 
shift and was then relieved by Dan Baker. Upon being 
relieved at the boathouse, the decedent obtained from 
Baker a company boat and fishing tackle and went out 
in the lake to fish, where he was drowned when a sudden 
windstorm arose. 
At the trial, a witness was permitted to testify to a 
conversation with Baker two days after the accident, in 
which Baker, in response to a question, was said to have 
replied, "No; they (decedent and a companion) were 
fishing for the resort company." The admission of this 
evidence was assigned as error. The court says : 
It will be noted that all of the testimony to 
the effect that the deceased was actually engaged 
in the business of fishing for the resort company 
at the time of the accident is hearsay. It is urged 
however, by defendant, that the declaration, testi-
fied as having been made by Dan Baker, that 
Busk and his companion were fishing for the re-
sort company, was made by him ''as agent for 
the plaintiff company, and his statement was an 
admission against the interest of the resort com-
pany." The evidence shows that Dan Baker was 
an employee of the company, had charge of the 
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boathouse, and rented boats to whomsoever might 
apply for them. It does not appear that the de-
clarations made by him were within the scope of 
his agency, if he be regarded as an agent, nor 
were they made in the course of his employment, 
nor the performance of any act within the scope 
of his authority. They were no part of the res 
gestae, either of the accident causing Busk's death, 
or of any transaction Baker was then engaged in 
on behalf of his principal. Under the settled law 
in this State, such statements are incompetent 
and cannot bind the principal. 
. . . We are of the opinion that all of the testi-
mony to the effect that Busk was within the scope 
of his employment while engaged in the fishing 
enterprise on the day of the accident rests upon 
hearsay or incompetent evidence. It is well settled 
that a material finding of fact based entirely upon 
hearsay or incompetent evidence cannot stand and 
will not support an award. (Citing several cases). 
It is submitted that this case is exactly in point and 
binding here. In that case Baker was a boathouseman 
in charge of handling a boathouse in which decedent was 
also an employee and apparently a subordinate one. In 
this case Smith is a "superintendent" in charge of build-
ing a single swimming pool, and the decedent was also 
an employee and a subordinate one. In that case, the al-
leged admissions of Baker were contradicted by him and 
were held to be incompetent. In this case, Smith's alleged 
admissions were contradicted by him and should be held 
to be incompetent. It is very respectfully submitted that 
we cannot see how the members of this Honorable Court 
can overrule or ignore this established authority. 
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Perhaps it will be of assistance to the court if a 
word or two is said about the authorities cited by defend-
ants on pages 12 and 13 of their original brief. 
Only two Utah cases are cited there by defendants. 
They are 
and 
Fishlake Resort Company vs. Industrial ·Commis-
sion, supra, 
Spring Canyon Coal Company v. Industrial Com-
mission, 58 Utah 608, 615, 616, 201 Pac. 173. 
The Fishlake Resort Company case has .already been 
discussed. It is in point, btd it supports the rule for 
which plaintiff here contends, not defendants. 
The Spring Canyon Coal Company case is not in 
point. It held that an award of compensation may not be 
based upon one of two available and contrary inferences 
which may be made from established facts, and also that 
the burden is on the claimant for Workmen's Compensa-
tion to prove that the death occurred by reason of an 
accident arising out of and in the course of the employ-
ment. To the extent that it is in point, it supports plain-
tiff's position, not the defendant's. 
The cases from California are decided by District 
Courts of Appeal, not by the court of last resort. Hence, 
under familiar rules they are not entitled to considera-
tion as authority here. J\1oreover, they are based upon 
a California statute, and not upon the common law, which, 
as we have hereinbefore demonstrated, is firmly estab-
lished in Utah as contrary to the rule which has been 
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deduced by the California District Courts of Appeal from 
the California statutes. 
Other cases, while they may he good law in the juris-
dictions from which they come, are contrary to the estab-
lished law in Utah, and, of course, should not, and indeed 
cannot, be followed by this court. A mere cursory read-
ing of the other cases wil indicate that few, if any, are 
in point. They deal with the performance of acts and 
the making of statements which have been previously 
proved to be within the scope of employment, or with 
declarations in the course of the performance of duty, 
or they deal with clear cases of res gestae, none of which 
is the case here. For these reasons, it is respecfully 
submitted they can furnish no support to the defendants' 
position, and no comfort to them. 
It is very respectfully submitted that under the 
authorities here and in the original brief of the plaintiff 
cited, the only purported evidence that the decedent Glad-
den was in the course of his employment when he died is 
hearsay and incompetent and cannot support the award, 
and that this court should recall its original opinion and 
direct that the award be vacated. 
POINT 2. 
THEREFORE THE A \V ARD IS UNSUPPORTED 
BY COMPE'TENT EVIDENCE, AND l\iUST BE VA-
CATED. 
Under the authority of 
Ogden Iron Works vs. Industrial Commission, 102 
Utah 492, 132 Pac. 2d 373, 
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cited on page 18 of plaintiff's original brief and also re-
ferred to in the court's opinion herein, under the author-
ity of the case of Fishlake Resort Company v. Industrial 
Commission, sttpra, and under the under the authorities 
cited in the FiJshlake Re.sort Company case, the award of 
the Commission cannot be sustained upon hearsay and 
incompetent evidence and must be vacated. 
For these reasons, the original decision of the court, 
being based upon a misapprehension of the issues, facts 
and law, should not, and cannot be allowed to stand. 
CONCLUSION 
We are sure that the members of the court will 
appreciate that it is with some diffidence that the write.r 
of this brief has pointed out what plaintiff believes to 
have been an inadvertent but complete misapprehension 
of the basic issues, facts and law which should control 
the decision in this case, and which require the court in 
the discharge of its duty under the constitution and to the 
people to reverse itself. However, it is believed that the 
writer's duty to the court no less than his duty to his 
client would not permit him to do less under the circum-
stances. 
As Dean Wigmore points out in the excerpt from his 
work on evidence hereinabove quoted, the controlling 
point is one of the substantive law of evidence. The 
applicable rule has been established in this State since 
1892 without question or substantial controversy, and the 
Legislature to whom the people have, in the division of 
powers of government under the Constitution, delegated 
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the authority to modify substantive rules of law have 
never seen fit to question the correctness of the rule an-
nounced by the predecessors in office of the present 
members of the court. Unde-r such circumstances, it 
seems certain that the present ' members of the court 
would not want to overturn this established rule of sub-
stantive law, or to bring about an apparent conflict in the 
decisions of the court through any failure of counsel ap-
pearing before the court to speak frankly and force-
fully once the issue is clearly drawn. This the writer has 
attempted to do, as in duty bound. It 1night well be added 
here that the rule of stiare decis,is is a salutary one, the 
existence of which makes the judiciary the "balance 
wheel" in the maintenance of social and legal stability 
so necessary for the preservation of a working demo-
cratic republic. It is believed that it would be most un-
fortunate if pressure of business, or the failure of coun-
sel to press home a point, or any other cause whatsoever 
should give rise to any seeming approval by the court 
of a practice of deciding cases by ignoring and failing 
to consider or cite judicial opinions which have estab-
lished the controlling rule of law. 
It is respectfully submitted that the prayer of the 
petition herein should be granted and the award vacated, 
or failing that, a complete rehaering should be granted, 
and that upon such rehearing, the award of the Industrial 
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Commission should be vacated, as required by the estab-
lished rule of law in the State of Utah. 
Very respectfully submitted, 
PAUL THATCHER of 
YOUNG, TI-IATCHER & 
GLASMANN and 
FUG.NTE, MITCHEN, McGINL·EY 
and HOFFMAN, 
Attorneys for Plaimt~ff 
I, Paul Thatcher, one of the attorneys for plaintiff 
certify that on July ff, 1961, I mailed two copies of 
the within and foregoing petition and brief to each of 
the attorneys for defendants, directed as follows : 
John C. Beaslin, Esq. 
423 West Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 
Leland C. McCullough, Esq. 
304 East First South, 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
and 
Walter L. Budge, 
Attorney General 
and 
Gordon A. Madsen, 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
A;~ke City14, Ut 
u~T~TCHER 
Attorney for Plaimtiff 
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